1. United States
2. Alaska
3. Letter

I submit the following concerns for consideration from a constitutional-law perspective. These observations are not intended as partisan critique, but as an assessment of structural risk to constitutional governance. Taken together, recent patterns of executive behavior raise concerns familiar to constitutional scholars: not necessarily because any single act is clearly unlawful, but because repeated boundary-testing can degrade constraints that the Constitution assumes will ordinarily hold. First, there is increasing erosion of the distinction between civilian governance and militarized authority. The constitutional system presumes civilian law enforcement as the default mechanism for domestic order, with military involvement remaining exceptional, limited, and clearly justified. Even when individual deployments or postures are argued as lawful, normalization of military framing or presence in domestic political contexts risks weakening this foundational boundary. Second, extraordinary or emergency authority appears increasingly framed as a sustained governing posture rather than a temporary response. Constitutional systems tolerate emergency powers only on the assumption that they are exceptional and time-bounded. When emergency reasoning becomes routine, ordinary constitutional processes are treated as impediments rather than safeguards, shifting the balance of powers toward executive dominance. Third, persistent rhetorical and operational pressure on independent institutions — including courts, career civil servants, inspectors general, and prosecutors — threatens norms that the Constitution relies upon but cannot fully codify. When compliance with law or process is characterized as disloyalty, institutional independence erodes even without formal statutory violation. Fourth, the personalization of executive authority presents constitutional risk. The Constitution vests power in offices, not individuals. Rhetoric or practice that equates loyalty to constitutional order with loyalty to a particular officeholder undermines the impersonal nature of lawful governance and weakens accountability mechanisms. Constitutional failure rarely results from a single unlawful act. It emerges through accumulation: repeated normalization of exception, erosion of institutional legitimacy, and precedent-setting that future actors may exploit with fewer restraints. Accordingly, the relevant constitutional question is not solely whether particular actions may be defended under existing doctrine, but whether their repetition degrades structural safeguards — including separation of powers, civilian control, and institutional independence — that courts alone cannot fully enforce. These concerns warrant careful scrutiny precisely because constitutional damage is often most visible only in hindsight.