1. United States
2. Colo.
3. Letter

I am writing in response to the recent bipartisan statement by Representatives Mike Lawler and Josh Gottheimer opposing the Massie-Khanna War Powers Resolution regarding Iran. The American people deserve clarity grounded in evidence and constitutional principle — not threat inflation or framing designed to manufacture urgency for war. There is no publicly presented, credible evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon or that an imminent attack against the United States is underway. U.S. intelligence assessments have repeatedly stated that Iran is not currently building a bomb. Enrichment is not weaponization. Treating technical capability as proof of intent lowers the threshold for war and risks repeating past catastrophic mistakes. Context matters. The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and reinstated sweeping sanctions. Iran’s subsequent reductions in compliance followed that withdrawal. Escalation did not originate in isolation. When one party exits a negotiated framework and reimposes economic pressure, it materially alters the compliance environment and shifts the trajectory of events. History matters as well. In 1953, the United States helped remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and supported the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an intervention that produced long-term instability and deep mistrust. That precedent complicates claims that external coercion reliably produces stability. Citing Iraq War troop deaths from nearly two decades ago to justify present-day military authorization ignores that those casualties occurred during a U.S. invasion initiated under false premises. Attribution to Iranian-supported militias does not equate to a current, imminent Iranian attack on the United States. Describing regional armed groups solely as Iranian “proxies” oversimplifies complex realities. While Iran provides funding and weapons to certain actors, those organizations maintain their own leadership structures and political calculations. Financial support does not automatically equal operational command. Iran’s internal governance is a matter for the Iranian people. However one evaluates that government, domestic political conditions do not constitute a legal basis for foreign military escalation. Similarly, missile development is common throughout the region. Treating Iran’s capabilities as uniquely destabilizing while overlooking comparable or more advanced arsenals among U.S.-aligned states reflects geopolitical alignment, not neutral threat assessment. In multiple high-profile exchanges — including retaliation following the killing of Qasem Soleimani — Iran calibrated its response and signaled in advance to limit U.S. casualties. Whatever one thinks of its leadership, escalation has at times been deliberately constrained rather than maximalist. Most importantly, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress — not the President — the authority to declare war. Framing oversight as weakness undermines the separation of powers itself. There is no imminent threat justifying expanded executive war authority. The American people do not benefit from military entanglements built on speculative danger. Congress must reject inflated narratives, demand factual clarity, and reclaim its constitutional role before further escalation occurs. Oversight is not weakness. It is your oath.