Counterintelligence Is the President’s Job — Not a Statutory Mandate

Dear Representative, I am writing to oppose Section 622 of the FY2027 Intelligence Authorization Act (S.4615). Section 622 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to require the President to expand and enhance intelligence sharing with a foreign government across nearly every category of Middle East intelligence. It would forbid any reduction or suspension of that sharing except on a narrow, individually documented national-security finding, reportable to Congress within fifteen days. In practice, that carve-out is not a safeguard — it is a deterrent against ever using it. My objection is structural, not partisan. Management of an intelligence-liaison relationship is a core executive and counterintelligence function. It depends on the ability to expand, narrow, or pause sharing as threats and partner conduct change. Converting that discretion into a statutory mandate removes the President’s leverage and exposes sensitive sources and methods on a fixed schedule the executive branch can no longer control. No foreign partner — ally or otherwise — should receive a legislated, non-reciprocal entitlement to American intelligence. This provision also reverses the usual constitutional posture. The same body ceding Article I authority elsewhere is here micromanaging a matter that belongs to the executive and the intelligence community. That is backwards. I urge you to strike Section 622 from the bill, or oppose the bill until it is removed. Protect the President’s authority to safeguard American intelligence on American terms. Signed, A Voting Constituent