Reforming the Office of the U.S. Attorney General

I am writing to express my strong support for reforming the Office of the U.S. Attorney General specifically the constitutional amendment framework outlined in the April 2026 proposal titled "Proposed XXVIII Amendment: Reforming the Attorney General's Role" (published April 26, 2026). I want to be explicit that I am referencing this specific proposal regarding the Attorney General's independence, not any other proposed 28th Amendment currently in circulation. The current structure of the Attorney General's office in which the AG serves entirely at the pleasure of the president creates a fundamental conflict of interest. The Attorney General is supposed to be the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, a guardian of the rule of law and the Constitution. Yet under the existing framework, the president can dismiss the AG at will for purely political reasons. This has repeatedly undermined public trust in the Department of Justice, regardless of which party holds the White House. The state-level model demonstrates there is a workable alternative. Forty-three states already elect their attorneys general, separating the role from direct executive control. While a direct federal popular election carries its own risks including campaign finance concerns and the potential for partisan grandstanding the spirit of the reform is sound: the AG must have structural independence from the executive branch. The proposed XXVIII Amendment as it relates to the AG would address this by reforming the nomination and removal process in a way that insulates the office from presidential pressure. I would urge you to support this proposal or sponsor legislation that moves it forward. At minimum, I ask that you: 1. Co-sponsor or actively review the proposed XXVIII Amendment reforming the AG's role as distinct from other amendment proposals 2. Hold hearings on structural AG independence, including testimony from legal scholars, former AGs, and state-level attorneys general who operate under elected or term-protected models 3. Explore interim legislative protections, such as statutory "for cause only" removal restrictions modeled on independent agency heads like the Federal Reserve Chair, which would not require a constitutional amendment The rule of law depends on an Attorney General who answers to the Constitution not to the political fortunes of whoever occupies the Oval Office. I urge you to act on this important structural reform. Thank you for your time and public service.