Support for the Risky Research Review Act (H.R. 1864 / S. 854)

I am writing as your constituent to express my support for the Risky Research Review Act (H.R. 1864 / S. 854). As our global capacity to engineer dangerous pathogens grows, so does the risk of a catastrophic laboratory accident. The current system of self regulation is insufficient to protect the public from a man made pandemic. The Risky Research Review Act is a vital first step. By establishing the Life Sciences Research Security Board as an independent body, this legislation correctly recognizes that researchers and funding agencies cannot be the sole arbiters of the risks involved. Removing this discretion is a necessary correction. However, to truly create an agency equal to the risk, I urge you to strengthen this bill during committee markup. To provide comprehensive security, the Act must move beyond the review of federal grants and address three critical vulnerabilities. First, the Board's jurisdiction should be expanded to cover all high risk pathogen research conducted within the United States, regardless of whether it is funded by the government or private entities. A laboratory leak is equally dangerous regardless of who paid for the experiment. Second, oversight must regulate the full pipeline. The Board should monitor the collection of novel viruses from the wild to ensure these pathogens are tracked and stored securely before any enhancement work begins. Third, the Board requires operational enforcement powers. This should include the authority to conduct site inspections, mandate specific biosafety levels, and establish a mandatory reporting system for all suspected accidents. Furthermore, the most dangerous experiments should be required to take place in secure facilities located away from population centers. We have learned from the history of nuclear energy that the most dangerous technologies require the most stringent independent oversight. We must apply that same logic to the life sciences. We cannot afford to wait for another pandemic to realize our guardrails were insufficient. I would appreciate you showing leadership on this issue and urge you to champion a version of this bill that provides a comprehensive and binding standard for pathogen research.