NO SALE: American Military & Uranium Enrichment & AI Tech for Crypto Profit

How much Trump crypto did the Saudi's have to buy to get their uranium enrichment deal? That's right, we'll never know, because this intersection of cryptocurrency with U.S. foreign policy decision-making is completely unregulated and unmonitored thanks, in part, to Congressional unwillingness to engage on this issue, particularly regarding technology transfers and strategic agreements with Middle Eastern polities. Recent years have seen a troubling pattern: the President and his close associates have developed significant cryptocurrency holdings and business interests, while simultaneously negotiating major foreign policy agreements involving advanced technology transfers, and deployment of military assets, to the same regions where those crypto interests have substantial investments or support. And the President has the gall to ask for $38 Billion to finance his illegal war. Consider the trajectory: the UAE AI chip deal was followed by promises of payment for military deployment in the Straits of Hormuz, followed by a uranium enrichment agreements with Saudi Arabia. These are not routine diplomatic matters—they involve sensitive technology and deployment of forces with national security implications that should require Congressional approval. Yet there is no transparency about whether officials negotiating these agreements have financial interests in cryptocurrency projects backed by the same foreign actors who benefit from these deals. When a nation's leadership has personal crypto wealth tied to investments from parties seeking favorable U.S. policy, we face a fundamental conflict of interest affecting our strategic interests. It is especially troubling when it gives the impression that the President is selling the services of our armed forces as mercenaries in return for 'foreign investment' in U.S. business - which apparently means the President's cryptocurrency. Sending our soldiers to and sailors to die for personal profit would be abhorrent; even a second- or third-order appearance of it should be avoided. And there are ancillary dangers. Such an approach invites foreign influence on core national security decisions through financial incentives rather than traditional diplomacy. It obscures the true drivers of policy from Congress and the public, undermining democratic oversight. It weakens our negotiating position—allies and adversaries alike can exploit these financial entanglements to secure concessions that don't serve American interests. The cryptocurrency space offers particular vulnerability because digital assets can be transferred quickly across borders, are difficult to trace, and operate in regulatory gray areas where foreign actors can accumulate leverage over U.S. officials with minimal accountability. I urge you to: 1) Require full disclosure of cryptocurrency holdings and crypto-related investments by the President, the State Department, the Defense Department, and National Security Council officials involved in technology transfer negotiations. 2) Mandate conflict-of-interest reviews before senior officials negotiate strategic agreements with foreign partners who may have connections to their crypto assets. 3) Investigate existing agreements for potential conflicts of interest affecting their terms and implementation. Please recall that Saudi nationals orchestrated the attacks on 11 September. What are we doing licensing uranium enrichment technology to a state that has so little control of its industrial infrastructure? Our foreign policy must serve American security interests, not the personal financial portfolios of policymakers. Transparency in this area is essential.